Monetary Policy with Incomplete Markets by Gourdel & Triki
INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY
P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
We consider an extension of a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets that consid-
ers cash-in-advance constraints. The total amount of money is supplied by an authority, which
produces at no cost and lends money to agents at short term nominal rates of interest, meeting
the demand. Agents have initial nominal claims, which in the aggregate, are the counterpart
of an initial public debt. The authority covers its expenditures, including initial debt, through
public revenues which consists of taxes and seignorage, and distributes its eventual budget sur-
pluses through transfers to individuals, while no further instruments are available to correct
eventual budget deﬁcits. We deﬁne a concept of equilibrium in this extended model, and prove
that there exists a monetary equilibrium with no transfers. Moreover, we show that if the price
level is high enough, a monetary equilibrium with transfers exists.
Keywords: Cash-in-advance constraints, incomplete markets, nominal assets, monetary equi-
librium, money, nominal interest rate
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1. Introduction
In the canonical general equilibrium model, all trade takes place in a barter economy, pre-
cluding the role of money as a medium of exchange. In 1965, Frank Hahn [10] has argued that
it was diﬃcult to justify a positive price for ﬁat money (i.e. paper money) (this is known as the
“Hahn Paradox”) which stipulates by a backward induction reasoning in a ﬁnite-period econ-
omy that money cannot have positive value. As discussed by Dubey–Geanakoplos [5], there are
several ways to overcome this paradox. Among them, one can consider an inﬁnite-horizon model
(Samuelson [15], Grandmont–Younes [9]), and in these cases, money has value because it is a
store of value. Another way to overcome Hahn’s Paradox is to introduce an external agent, who
stands ready to trade commodities for money (Lucas [13], Magill–Quinzii [14]). Alternatively,
following Lerner [11], one could postulate the existence of a government that is owed in taxes. In
these two latter cases, money has value because an external agent gives something in exchange
for it.
The present paper considers the presence of an external agent, an authority, and the theoret-
ical work underlying it, Dr` eze–Polemarchakis [4], [3], consists in formulating an intertemporal
general equilibrium model with money, introducing reasonable assumptions that guarantee the
existence of equilibria in this extended model. In order to deﬁne a general competitive equilibria
in a monetary economy, we modify the canonical Walrasian model by introducing an incom-
plete ﬁnancial market and money balances that facilitate transactions. Fiat money produced at
Cermsem, Universit´ e Paris-I Panth´ eon Sorbonne, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hˆ opital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
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no cost by banks serves as medium of exchange. An authority lends money to agents against
promise of reimbursement with interest rate, or equivalently, in exchange for interest bearing
bonds. All initial holdings of money are the counterparts of debts to banks. In the monetary
vocabulary of monetary economies, this is a model of “inside money”
1. It is a model appropriate
for economies where an authority issues money in exchange for oﬀsetting claims. There is no
default, and the authority raises revenue from taxes and seignorage. It distributes its eventual
surpluses as lump-sum transfers to agents. The demand for money at given commodity prices
and interest rates results from the preference maximizing choice of individuals. As store of
value, non-interest-bearing ﬁat money is dominated by interest-bearing nominal assets. Bal-
ances, prices and rates of interests do not enter as arguments of preferences of the agents.
Over a ﬁnite horizon with no public debt, and no taxes, Dr` eze and Polemarchakis [3] proved
the existence of equilibria for arbitrarily set nominal rates of interest and price levels at all
terminal nodes. In a recent joint paper with Bloize [1], they proved the existence over an inﬁnite
horizon economy under uncertainty and complete asset markets. The primitive of the model
include nominal claims held by individuals (that in the aggregate are the counterpart of initial
public debt). Their work extends for Woodford [17] in the case of heterogeneous agents, which
is in term similar to cash-in-advance economies with a representative agent as in Lucas–Stockey
[12]. Woodford [17] asserts that the price level is determinate so as to balance the initial public
debt and public revenu from taxes and seignorage. Similarly, Dubey–Geanakoplos [6] obtain
deterministic equilibria considering the case of a given initial shock of outside money. On the
other hand, Bloize–Dr` eze–Polemarchakis [1] obtain indeterminacy of equilibria since they as-
sume that the public authority can redistribute its eventual surpluses.
In this paper, we propose an extension of Bloize–Dr` eze–Polemarchakis [1], in an incomplete
market setting, and over a ﬁnite, two-period horizon. The main results are:
• The existence of a monetary equilibrium with no transfers, under reasonnable assump-
tions.
• The existence of a monetary equilibrium above a lower bound of the overall price level,
when the authority faces a budget surplus. Two alternative assumptions on the public
portfolio (the portfolio that the authority supplies) are proposed and the results are
compared.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin by introducing the primitive of the model, as well
as the time and uncertainty setup (Section 2). We also deﬁne an appropriate notion of monetary
equilibria, and state the assumptions under which existence will be proved. Section 3 proves the
existence of equilibria with no transfers. Finally, Section 4 proves existence when the authority
faces a budget surpluses.
2. A 2-Period Monetary Economy
We consider a ﬁnite set I of agents, two periods t = 0 and t = 1 with a ﬁnite set S of states
of the world at the second period. We denote Σ = {0} ∪ S, where 0 is the state of the world
known with certainty at t = 0. The state of the world σ ∈ Σ is called a date-event state. There
1Several authors have studied the implications of integrating outside money in a general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets. Main contributions are Dubey–Geanakoplos [6].INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 3
is a ﬁnite set of goods L available for trades at both periods, a ﬁnite set J of 1-period maturity
nominal assets that agents can buy at t = 0 and which yield monetary returns at t = 1.
We denote by y• the family:
y• = (yi, i ∈ I)
• The commodity market Ec is described by Ec = (X•,u•,e•,g•,ξ•) where, for each agent
i ∈ I, Xi ⊂ RLΣ
+ is the consumption set of agent i. A vector xi ∈ Xi is a consumption
plan. The utility function ui : Xi −→ R describes the preferences of agent i ∈ I. The
initial endowments are given by ei ∈ RLΣ
+ and every agent i pays taxes gi ∈ RLΣ
+ to the
authority. Notice that in particular, it can be assumed that gi = ηiei, for some 0 6 ηi < 1
with η• > 0 being some tax rates across individuals. Our commodity taxes then reduce
to a wealth tax. The public authority also issues transfers t which are elements of RΣ.
These transfers are distributed to individuals according to given shares ξi ∈]0,1[ such
that
P
i∈I ξi = 1 and each agent receives the amount ξit.
• The ﬁnancial market Ef is described by Ef = (R,Θ•,θ) where R ∈ RS×J is the return
matrix, J 6 S, and for every (s,j) ∈ S × J, R(s,j) ∈ R is denominated in units of
account. For each agent i ∈ I, Θi ⊂ RJ is the portfolio set of agent i. Given an agent
i ∈ I and a portfolio θi ∈ Θi, (R(σ)θi,σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ denotes the image of θi by R.
Finally, the portfolio θ ∈ RJ is the total amount of each asset available for trade, ﬁxed
by the authority.
• The money market is described by Em = (w•,r) where w• ∈ RΣI and for each i ∈ I,
wi(0) ∈ R+ are initial individual nominal claims against the authority (corresponding
to the public debt). For convenience, we introduce the following notation: for every
agent i ∈ I, wi = (wi(σ),σ ∈ Σ) where wi(s) = 0, and for all states s ∈ S. We
setw =
P
i∈I wi. Short term nominal rates of interest r are positive element of RΣ
exogenously given.
Finally, a monetary economy is the triplet
E = (Ec,Ef,Em).
2.1. The transactions demand for money. Let us begin by introducing these notations: Let
p ∈ RLΣ
+ the commodity price vector. We deﬁne the payoﬀ matrix V ∈ RΣ×J by V = (−q R).
This operator summarizes the ﬁnancial structure of the economy, given that q ∈ RJ is the asset
price vector. Let an agent i ∈ I. We denote net trades by zi = (xi − ei), where xi ∈ Xi and ei
initial endowments, zi
+ = (xi − ei)+ net purchases, zi
− = (xi − ei)− net sales2. We will denote
by b mi ∈ RΣ
+ initial money balance, and by mi ∈ RΣ
+ terminal money balance.
An important modeling choice concerns the treatment of time. There are two periods. For-
mally, a date is a point of time. For purpose of interpretation, the length of time period is
thought as non-trivial. Precise timing of transactions does not aﬀect preferences while it does
aﬀect money balances and accounting. Taking this into account, we follow the convention that
budget constraints will be written at beginning-of-period, given a path of interest rate r ∈ RΣ
2For a scalar, z
+ = max {z,0} and z
− = max {−z,0}; for a vector, z
+ = (...,zk+,...) and z
− =
(...,zk−,...). Notice that z = z
+ − z
−. Moreover, recall that the functions z −→ z
+ and z −→ z
− are
convex.4 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI





Consider a date-event σ ∈ Σ. The transaction demand for money follows the scheme of cash-
in-advance constraints introduced by Clower [2]. An agent i ∈ I acquires cash balances b mi(σ) by
borrowing initially from the authority in exchange for bonds at the rate of interest r(σ) ∈ R+,
according to the constraint
bi(σ) + b mi(σ) = 0.
Subsequently, he purchases commodities according to the constraint:
p(σ) · zi
+(σ) 6 b mi(σ), (2.2)
He accumulates end-of-period balances from the sale of commodities according to the con-
straint
p(σ) · zi
−(σ) = mi(σ), (2.3)
At the end of the period, or at the beginning of a subsequent, ﬁctitious period that serves for
accounting purposes, the agent settles his debt according to the constraint:
(1 + r(σ))b mi(σ) + p(σ) · gi(σ) − (V θi)(σ) − ξit(σ) 6 mi(σ) + (1 + r(σ))wi(σ)
where gi(σ) ∈ RL
+ are commodity taxes payed to the authority, wi(σ) ∈ R+ are nominal initial
claims against the authority that agent receive at beginning-of-period, θi is the portfolio he
chooses to acquire, and ξit(σ) ∈ R is the amount of transfers that his share ξi allows him to
obtain. According to equations 2.2 and 2.3, the budget equation of agent i at date-event σ ∈ Σ
is summarized by:
(1 + r(σ))[p(σ) · zi
+(σ)] + p(σ) · gi(σ) 6 p(σ) · zi
−(σ) + (V θi)(σ) + ξit(σ) + (1 + r(σ))wi(σ)
p(σ) · [zi







+ (e V θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξit(σ)








(e V θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξie t(σ)




−(σ) 6 (e V θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξie t(σ)
For each commodity price p ∈ RΣL
+ and each consumption plan x ∈ RΣL
+ , we deﬁne the vector
px ∈ RΣ by
px = (p(σ) · x(σ),σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ
where the operator · is the scalar product in RΣL.
For each interest rate r ∈ RΣ
+ and each money balance m ∈ RΣ
+, we deﬁne the vector r◦m ∈ RΣ
by
r◦m = (r(σ)m(σ),σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ
We get to the overall budget constraints:
p(xi − ei + e gi) + e r◦(p(xi − ei)−) 6 e V θi + wi + ξie t. (2.4)INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 5
2.2. Authority. The authority enters a date-event 0 with a given public liability w(0) and
covers this beginning-of-period expenditure and end-of-period supply of security θ ∈ RJ by
collecting commodity taxes e g(0) ∈ RL
+, given that money balances m(0) ∈ R+ are supplied so
as to accommodate the market demand, where






At the end-of-period, the authority distributes its eventual budget surpluses as transfers to
individuals t(0) ∈ R determined by the beginning-of-period constraint:






+ p(0) · e g(0) + e q · θ − w(0) (2.5)
These transfers are distributed among agents according to their exogenous shares ξi ∈ [0,1], and
vary accordingly to diﬀerent consumption allocation x• ∈ RΣLI
+ .
At date-event s ∈ S, given end-of-period returns of assets, and collected taxes e g(σ) ∈ RL
+ the
eventual budget surpluses distributed among agents amount to:






+ p(s) · e g(s) − (e Rθ)(s) (2.6)
The overall constraint faced by the authority sums up to:
e t = e r◦p
X
i∈I
(xi − ei)− + pe g − e V θ − w (2.7)
We can now go through the deﬁnition of an equilibrium and state the main result of the paper.
2.3. Deﬁnitions and notations. Given a commodity price vector p ∈ RLΣ
+ and an asset price
q ∈ RJ, we introduce the budget set of an agent i ∈ I by:
Bi(p,q,t) :=
n
(xi,θi) ∈ Xi × Θi : p(xi − ei + e gi) + e r◦[(p(xi − ei)−] 6 e V θi + wi + ξie t
o
A consumption plan xi ∈ Xi and a composition of portfolio θi ∈ Θi are budget feasible for
agent i ∈ I if these actions belong to budget set Bi(p,q,t).
Given a commodity price vector p ∈ RLΣ
+ , agent i’s behavior in this economy is summarized
by the demand correspondence di(p,q,t) deﬁned by:
di(p,q,t) :=

(xi,θi) ∈ Bi(p,q,t), Bi(p,q,t) ∩ [Pi(xi) × Θi] = ∅
	
where Pi(xi) := {y ∈ Xi : ui(y) > ui(xi)}.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A collection (x•,θ•,p,q,t) ∈ RLΣI
+ × RJI × RLΣ
+ × RJ
+ × RΣ is a monetary
equilibrium of a monetary economy E = (Ec,Ef,Em) if
(i) For each agent i ∈ I, (xi,θi) ∈ di(p,q,t),
(ii) The public plan t satisﬁes the authority’s budget constraints:





+ pe g − e V θ − w.






i∈I θi = θ.
A monetary equilibrium is said to be with no-transfers if e t = 0.6 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
2.4. Assumptions. Before stating the assumptions, let us introduce the following notation: A
vector v = (v(σ), σ ∈ Σ)) in RΣ is said to be positive, denoted by v > 0, if ∀σ ∈ Σ, v(σ) >
0, v 6= 0, and it is said to be strictly positive, denoted by v  0 if, ∀σ ∈ Σ, v(σ) > 0.
The commodity market Ec = (X•,u•,e•,g•,ξ•) is subject to the following assumptions: for
each agent i ∈ I,
C1 The consumption set Xi is a closed, convex subset of the positive orthant of RLΣ, and ei > 0.
C2 The utility function is continuous, strictly monotone and strictly quasi-concave.3
C3 There exists a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi − ei + gi  0.
This is a strong survival assumption in this extended model. After paying his taxes, agent i can
still consume.
The ﬁnancial market Ef = (R,Θ•,θ) is subject to the following assumptions:
F1 For each agent i ∈ I, the portfolio set Θi is equal to RJ.
F2 The return matrix R has full rank. For convenience, we assume R > 04.
F3 The public portfolio is non-negative, i.e. θ > 0.
Non-risky asset
NRA The public portfolio is a non-risky portfolio:
Rθ  0.
Assumptions (C1) to (F2) are the standard assumptions considering an incomplete market frame-
work. We provide hereafter speciﬁc assumptions due to the extension of the incomplete market
framework that we consider.
Transfers
T1 Transfers t are distributed among agents through given shares ξ•, i.e. each agent receives
the amount ξit.
Public Revenue
PR Aggregate taxes g =
P
i∈I gi are strictly positive.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A monetary economy E = (Ec,Ef,Em) is said to be standard if it satisﬁes the
above assumptions
Initial public debt
M1 The total amount of initial liabilities is positive: w(0) > 0.
Finally, we propose in the following two additional assumptions on the ﬁnancial and money
market Ef = (R,Θ•,θ):
3The utility function u














4Assuming that the public portfolio is a non-risky portfolio (refer to Assumption (NRA) deﬁned later), there
is no loss of generality in considering R > 0. One may refer to Lemma 4.3 for the proof of this result.INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 7
Public Portfolio
PP The public portfolio consists only in safe bonds5, i.e. θ = I 1J
6.
Neither (PP) implies (NRA), nor is the converse true. Assumption (PP) is a restrictive
assumption, but allows us to precise properties on ﬁrst period price levels that is lost when one
considers only (NRA) (refer to Theorem 2.2, or Theorem 2.3). The results to be proved are the
following:
Theorem 2.1. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumptions (M1), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 ﬁxed by the authority, there exists a monetary equilibrium with no
transfers (x•,θ•,p,q) of E.
Remark 2.1. In the previous theorem, we may consider a weaker version of Assumption (PR),
namely, requiring g(σ) > 0 in all states σ ∈ Σ.
Before stating the existence of a monetary equilibrium with transfers, let us introduce the




|hd|. And we denote by B(n,k) the closed ball on Rn of radius k > 0, with center 0.
Let d ∈ RΣ
++. We call d(σ) the overall price level at date-event σ ∈ Σ when d is deﬁned by:
d(0) = kp(0)k + ke qk and d(s) = kp(s)k, s ∈ S.
Theorem 2.2. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumption (PP), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 ﬁxed by the authority, there is d? ∈ RΣ
+, such that, for every
d > d?, d  0, there exists a monetary equilibrium with transfers (x•,θ•,p,q,t) of E with
kp(0)k + ke qk = d(0) and kp(s)k = d(s) for every date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
We also prove that by choosing a higher price level (c? > d?), we show that, at equilibrium,
transfers are positive.
Theorem 2.3. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumption (PP), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 ﬁxed by the authority, there is c? ∈ RΣ, c?  0 such that, for
every c > c? there exists a monetary equilibrium with positive transfers (x•,θ•,p,q,t) of E with
kp(0)k + ke qk = c(0) and kp(s)k = c(s) for every date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
If we drop assumption (PP), we get the following corollaries of Theorem 2.2 and Theorem
2.3:
Corollary 2.1. Let E be a standard monetary economy. For every path of rate of interest r > 0
ﬁxed by the authority, there is e? ∈ RS, e?  0 such that, for every e > e? there exists a
monetary equilibrium with transfers (x•,θ•,p,q,t) of E with kp(s)k = e(s) for every date-event
s ∈ S of the second period.
Corollary 2.2. Let E be a standard monetary economy. For every path of rate of interest r > 0
ﬁxed by the authority, there is e? ∈ RS, e?  0 such that, for every e > e? there exists a
monetary equilibrium with positive transfers (x•,θ•,p,q,t) of E with kp(s)k = e(s) for every
date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
5Given a dimensional space R
n, we denote I 1n the vector in R
n with all components equal to one.
6Notice that it is equivalent to consider any public portfolio θ  0 in assumption (PP), given an adequate
corresponding choice of the return matrix R.8 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
It is important to notice here that Corollary 2.1 is a consequence of Theorem 2.2, while
Corollary 2.2 is a consequence of Theorem 2.3. A more reasonable assumption on the public
portfolio (in particular (NRA)) prevents us to get precise information on ﬁrst period price levels.
The next section is devoted for the proof of the case of no transfers. Section 4 will study the
case of transfers.
3. Existence of Monetary Equilibrium with No Transfers
The proof follows the usual scheme considering an incomplete market setting, The general
method of proof is the usual incomplete market arguments as in Duﬃe [7], Florenzano [8],
Werner [16], among others.
We begin by identifying compact, convex sets for consumption sets and portfolio sets. Adapt-
ing the work of Bloize–Dr` eze–Polemarchakis [1] in an incomplete market framework, we modify
budget sets by introducing an index µ ∈ RΣ
+ of the reciprocal of the overall price level leading
to well-behaved correspondences. Applying Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem in (p,q,x•,θ•,µ)
leads to the existence of an abstract equilibrium, an equilibrium concept which is deﬁned below
(Deﬁnition 3.2). The last step of the proof consists in showing that under (PR)–(NRA)–(M1),
the introduced index is strictly positive, and the abstract equilibrium is achieved as an monetary
equilibrium with no transfers.
3.1. Truncating the economy. Given assumptions (C2) and (F2), we may restrict ourselves
to positive commodity and asset prices. We consider the following compact, convex set for





+: kp(0)k + ke qk = 1 and kp(s)k = 1, ∀s ∈ S
	
We provide hereafter the deﬁnition of a truncated monetary economy. The following lemma
establishes that in order to prove Theorem 2.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality
that commodity and ﬁnancial sets are compact.
Deﬁnition 3.1. If Ec = (X•,u•,e•,g•,ξ•) is a commodity market, and Ef = (R,Θ•,θ) is a











where, for each i ∈ I, Xi
k = Xi ∩ B(Σ × L,k). We set ui
k as the restriction of ui to Xi
k,
Θi
k = Θi ∩ B(J,k).









(xi − ei) = 0
)
(3.1)
For every i ∈ I, b Xi is the projection of b X on Xi.
The sets (b Θi, i ∈ I) of attainable portfolios are deﬁned as follows:
b Θi := {θi ∈ Θi : ∃(p,q) ∈ Π, ∃xi ∈ b Xi, p(xi − ei + e gi) + e r◦(p(xi − ei)−) = e V θi + wi}.
We set b Θ =
Q
i∈I
b Θi.INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 9
Lemma 3.1. Let Ec commodity market and Ef a ﬁnancial market. Then
(a) There exists k > 0 such that
∀i ∈ I, b Xi ⊂ intB(Σ × L,k), b Θi ⊂ intB(J,k) (3.2)
(b) If k > 0 is suﬃciently large such that 3.2 is satisﬁed, then for each money market Em, any
monetary equilibrium of the truncated economy (Ec
k,E
f
k,Em) is a monetary equilibrium
of the initial economy (Ec,Ef,Em).
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is referred to the appendix (A1). We can now ﬁx k > 0. Following
Lemma 3.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality that for each i ∈ I, the sets Xi and
Θi are compact. Let us introduce the following notation: Consider a set V ⊂ Rn. We recall
that the convex hull of V, denoted by co(V ) ⊂ Rn is the smallest convex set containing V .








, ∀σ ∈ Σ.











Xi, ∃(p,q) ∈ Π,
µ(0)w(0) = e r(0)p(0) · v(x,0) + p(0) · e g(0) + e qθ




Claim 3.1. The set M ⊂ RΣ is compact.
Proof. The compactness of M follows from assumptions (M1)–(F2)–(NRA) and from the com-
pactness of X and Π. Let (xi
ν,pν,qν) be a sequence in Xi ×Π and (µν) a sequence in M. Then,
for each ν ∈ N, we have










+ pν(0) · e g(0) + qνθi










+ pν(s) · e g(s)
According to assumption (M1), w(0) > 0, and according to (NRA), (R(s)θ) > 0, ∀s ∈ S, thus
we can suppose that µν converges µ. Note that µ ∈ M. 
3.2. Modifying budget sets. For each (p,q,µ) ∈ Π × M, we deﬁne βi(p,q,µ) the following
modiﬁed budget set of agent i ∈ I deﬁned by the set of actions (xi,θi) ∈ Xi × Θi such that:
p(0) · (xi(0) − ei(0) + e gi(0)) + e r(0)
 
p(0) · (xi(0) − ei(0))−
6 −e qθi + µ(0)wi(0)
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
6 µ(s)(e Rθi)(s), ∀s ∈ S
The associated demand correspondence is deﬁned by:
δi(p,q,µ) :=

(xi,θi) ∈ βi(p,q,µ), βi(p,q,µ) ∩ [Pi(xi) × Θi] = ∅
	
Let us begin by introducing the notion of abstract equilibrium10 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
Deﬁnition 3.2. An abstract equilibrium consists in a collection (p,q,x•,θ
•
) and an index of
the reciprocal overall price levels µ ∈ RΣ
+, such that:
(i) For every agent i ∈ I, (xi,θ
i
) ∈ δi(p,q,µ)















i∈I θi = θ,
Remark 3.1. If µ  0 , and (p,q,x•,θ•,µ) is an abstract equilibrium of E, then (p0,q0,x•,θ•) is








For each i ∈ I, for each (p,q,µ) ∈ Π×M, we denote by β0i the interior of the set βi on Π×M.
Lemma 3.2. For every agent i ∈ I, the correspondence β0i has non-empty values on Π × M.
The proof of this lemma is referred in appendix (A2). We have the following properties for
the modiﬁed correspondences:
Claim 3.2. For each agent i ∈ I,
(i) the correspondence βi is u.s.c. on Π × M with compact convex values.
(ii) the correspondence βi is l.s.c. on Π × M .
(iii) the demand correspondence δi is u.s.c. on Π×M with non-empty compact, convex values.
The proof of this claim is given in appendix (A3).
3.3. Applying Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. Let us deﬁne the correspondence





































µ ∈ M :





− + p(0) · e g(0) + e qθ





− + p(s) · e g(s)
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Correspondence F is u.s.c. with non-empty convex compact values. Applying Kakutani’s
ﬁxed point theorem, there exists (p,q,x•,θ
•




i∈I Θi × M such that:
∀i ∈ I,(xi,θ
i
) ∈ δi(p,q,µ), (3.3)
∀(p,q) ∈ Π, (p − p) ·
X
i∈I





− θ) 6 0, (3.4)









+ p(0) · e g(0) +e qθ (3.5)









+ p(s) · e g(s) (3.6)
We will now show that the obtained ﬁxed point is an abstract equilibrium. In order to do
this, we need only to prove that commodity and asset markets clear. This follows from Claims
3.3 to 3.8.
For convenience, we introduce the following sets ∆(σ), ∀σ ∈ Σ:
∆(0) := {(p(0),q) ∈ RL
+×RJ
+ : kp(0)k+kqk = 1} ∆(s) := {(p(s),s ∈ S) ∈ RSL
+ : kp(s)k = 1}
Note that ∆(σ) for all date-event σ ∈ Σ are simply projections of Π. For a given set U ∈ Rn, we
denote by U◦ the negative polar cone of U, i.e. the cone of vectors η ∈ Rn such that η · u 6 0,
for every u ∈ U.









¯ θi 6 θ
Proof. Taking p(s) = p(s) for every date-event s ∈ S in ﬁxed point property (3.4), one has, for




(xi(0) − ei(0)) + q · (
X
i∈I
¯ θi − θ) 6 p(0) ·
X
i∈I
(xi(0) − ei(0)) +e q · (
X
i∈I
¯ θi − θ) (3.7)
Moreover, ﬁxed point property (3.3) states that (xi,θ
i
) ∈ βi(p,q,µ). Summing ﬁrst period







+e q · (
X
i∈I
¯ θi − θ) 6 0 (3.8)







+ q · (
X
i∈I









i∈I ¯ θi − θ)











¯ θi 6 θ.
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ei(s), ∀s ∈ S
Proof. Consider a date-event s ∈ S. According to ﬁxed point property (3.4), by choosing













, ∀ p(s) ∈ ∆(s).
Moreover, ﬁxed point property (3.3) states that (xi,θ
i
) ∈ βi(p,q,µ). Summing second period










¯ θi − θ) (3.9)
Since µ > 0, R > 0 (assumption (F2)), and (
P



















Claim 3.5. Budget constraints of all agents i ∈ I are saturated:
p(0) · (xi(0) − ei(0) + e gi(0)) + e r(0)
 
p(0) · (xi(0) − ei(0))−
+e qθi = µ(0)wi(0) (3.11)
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
= µ(s)(e Rθi)(s) (3.12)
Proof. We will only consider the case where s ∈ S (for s = 0, the proof is similar). Assume on
the contrary that (3.12) does not hold, i.e. there exists i ∈ I, and a date-event s ∈ S where the
equality is not true, i.e.
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
< µ(s)(e Rθi)(s).
In view of Claims (3.3)–(3.4) and of our choice of k, there exists some consumption plan xi ∈
B(ΣL,k) satisfying xi > xi and





) ∈ βi(p,q,µ). Following assumption (C1), ui(xi) > ui(xi), which yields a contra-
diction to the ﬁxed point property 3.3. 
Claim 3.6. Commodity prices are strictly positive, i.e. p  0.
Proof. Indeed, if not, there exists a date-event σ ∈ Σ and a good ` ∈ L such that p(σ,`) = 0.
Let us consider an agent i ∈ I. In view of our choice of k and Claims (3.3)–(3.4), we can
ﬁnd some consumption plan xi ∈ B(ΣL,k) such that xi(σ) > xi(σ) and (xi,θ
i
) ∈ βi(p,q,µ).
Following assumption (C1), ui(xi) > ui(xi), which yields a contradiction to the ﬁxed point
property (3.3). 
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i∈I θi − θ

































Proof. Indeed, according to the previous claim, one has e q·
 P
i∈I θi − θ

= 0. Moreover, referring













one has e V θ > 0. Assume that there exists a date-event σ ∈ Σ such that
e V (σ)θ > 0. (3.14)
Let an agent i ∈ I. According to Claim 3.5, budget constraints of agents are saturated at ﬁxed
point. Consider an agent i ∈ I, One has,
p(xi − ei + e gi) + e r◦(p(xi − ei)−) = e V θ
i
Hence, for λ > 0, one has (xi,θ
i
+ λθ) ∈ βi(p,e q,µ). Moreover, recalling inequality (3.14), one
has at date-event σ ∈ Σ,
p(σ) · (xi(σ) − ei(σ) + e gi(σ)) + e r(σ)(p(σ) · (xi(σ) − ei(σ))−) < e V (σ)(θ
i
+ λθ)
One can ﬁnd an allocation xi ∈ B(ΣL,k) such that (xi,(θ
i
+λθ)) ∈ δi(p,e q,µ) which contradicts
ﬁxed point property (3.3). As for the clearance of second period commodity markets, it is
straightforward by summing among all agents second period’s saturated budget constraints
(3.12) and the fact that p(s)  0 for all date-event s ∈ S (Claim 3.6). 
We have proved that there exists an abstract equilibrium. In order for the abstract equilibrium
to be achieved as an equilibrium, we need to show that at every abstract equilibrium, µ  0.
The following lemma shows under what condition this is satisﬁed.
Lemma 3.3. Under (M1)–(NRA)–(PR), at every abstract equilibrium µ  0, and the abstract
equilibrium is achieved as an equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that (PR) is satisﬁed. Referring to 3.5, one has:
µ(0)w(0) > p(0)e g(0) +e q · θ.14 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
Since p(0)  0, the fact that e g(0)  0 and recalling assumption (M1), w(0) > 0, one has
µ(0) > 0.
Moreover, referring to 3.6, one has at a state s ∈ S of the second period:
µ(s)(Rθ)(s) > p(s)e g(s) > 0.
Since θ is a non-risky portfolio, one has µ(s) > 0, ∀s ∈ S.

Hence, we have proved the existence of an abstract equilibrium with strictly positive index
of the reciprocal of the overall price level. Following remark 3.1, we get that there exists a
monetary equilibrium (p0,q0,x•,θ
•








4. Existence of Monetary Equilibrium with Transfers
Let E be a standard economy satisfying assumption (PP) and (NRA). Let d ∈ RΣ
++. Given
assumptions (C1) and (F2), we may restrict ourselves to positive commodity and asset prices.





+: kp(0)k + ke qk = d(0) and kp(s)k = d(s), ∀s ∈ S
	
4.1. Truncating the economy. We provide hereafter the deﬁnition of a truncated monetary
economy. The following lemma establishes that in order to prove Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3,
we can suppose without any loss of generality that commodity and ﬁnancial sets are compact.
Transfers are also considered to belong to an adequate compact, convex set.
Deﬁnition 4.1. If Ec = (X•,u•,e•,g•,ξ•) is a commodity market, and Ef = (R,Θ•,θ) is a











where, for each i ∈ I, Xi
h = Xi ∩ B(Σ × L,h). We set ui
h as the restriction of ui to Xi
k,
Θi
h = Θi ∩ B(J,h), and Th = B(Σ,h).












+ pe g − e V θ − w
)
Let the set of attainable portfolios be deﬁned by:
b Θi = {θi ∈ Θi : ∃(p, e q) ∈ Πd, ∃xi ∈ b Xi, ∃t ∈ b T, p(xi−ei+e gi)+e r◦(p(xi−ei)−) = e V θi+wi+ξie t}




Notice here that the attainable portfolio sets depend now on transfers t ∈ b T, thus compactness
of b Θ will crucially depend on the compactness of b T.
Lemma 4.1. Let Ec commodity market and Ef a ﬁnancial market. ThenINCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 15
(a) There exists h > 0 such that
∀i ∈ I, b Xi ⊂ intB(Σ × L,h), b Θi ⊂ intB(J,h) and b T ⊂ B(Σ,h) (4.1)
(b) If h > 0 is suﬃciently large such that 4.1 is satisﬁed, then for each money market Em, any
monetary equilibrium of the truncated economy (Ec
h,E
f
h,Em) is a monetary equilibrium
of the initial economy (Ec,Ef,Em).
The proof of this lemma is referred in appendix (A4). We can now ﬁx h > 0. Following
Lemma 4.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality that for each i ∈ I, the sets Xi and
Θi are compact. For convenience, we set T = Th.
4.2. Modifying budget sets. We will begin by deﬁning the adequate price level that one
should consider. Let an agent i ∈ I. According to assumption (C3), for every agent i ∈ I, there
exists a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi −ei +gi  0. Thus, for every date-event σ ∈ Σ,
there exists χi(σ) > 0 such that xi − ei + gi  −χiI 1Σ.


























, ∀s ∈ S (4.3)
Consider price levels d  0, d > d?, and let the mapping γ, from T into T,7 be deﬁned by:
γ(t) := γ((t,σ), σ ∈ Σ) where γ(t,σ) = max{e t(σ), e K(σ)}, (4.4)
given that
K(0) := d(0)Min{1,g(0)} − w(0)(1 + r(0)), K(s) := d(s)g(s) − R(s)θ, ∀s ∈ S. (4.5)
For each i ∈ I, for each (p,q,t) ∈ Πd × T, we deﬁne the following correspondances:
Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)) := {(xi,θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : p(xi−ei+e gi)+e r◦
 
p(xi − ei)−
6 e V θi+wi+ξiγ(t)}.
βi
d(p,q,γ(t)) := {(xi,θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : p(xi−ei+e gi)+e r◦
 
p(xi − ei)−
 e V θi+wi+ξiγ(t)}.
di
d(p,q,γ(t)) := {(xi,θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : (xi,θi) ∈ Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)) and [Pi(xi)×Θi]∩Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)) := ∅}
As we shall see in the following lemma, the constructed price level d? ∈ RΣ
+ leads to the
non-emptyness of βi
d on Πd × T.
Lemma 4.2. For every agent i ∈ I, the correspondence βi
d has non-empty values on Πd × T.
For the proof of Lemma 4.2, refer to appendix (A5). We have the following properties for the
modiﬁed correspondences:
Claim 4.1. For each agent i ∈ I,
(i) the correspondence Bi
d is u.s.c. on Πd × T with compact convex values.
7Recall that T = Th, and given the deﬁnition of K, one can always choose h > 0 big enough in order for γ to
be deﬁned from T into T.16 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
(ii) the correspondence Bi
d is l.s.c. on Πd × T.
(iii) the demand correspondence is u.s.c. on Πd ×T with non-empty compact, convex values.
The constructed correspondences are well behaved. We may now apply a ﬁxed point theorem
that will lead us to the existence of a monetary equilibrium.
4.3. Applying Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. Let us deﬁne the correspondence






















(p,q) ∈ Πd: ∀(p0,q0) ∈ Πd,(p − p0) ·
X
i∈I
(xi − ei) + (e q − e q0) · (
X
i∈I













+ pe g − e V θ − w
)
The correspondence Fd is u.s.c. with non-empty convex compact values. Applying Kakutani’s
ﬁxed point theorem, there exists (p,q,x•,θ
•









∀(p,q) ∈ Πd, (p − p) ·
X
i∈I





− θ) 6 0, (4.7)








+ pe g − e V θ − w. (4.8)
Notice here that the ﬁxed point obtained satisﬁes (xi,θ
i
) ∈ di(p,q,γ(t)). According to the




d(p,q,t). Finally, in order to prove that the obtained ﬁxed point is achieved as a
monetary equilibrium, we need only to show that commodity and asset markets clear. These
proofs are very similar to the case of no transfers, one needs only to replace conditions (3.5) and
(3.6) by the new authority’s constraint (4.8).
4.4. Application: The case of positive transfers. This section is devoted to the proof of
Theorem 2.3: In choosing a higher price level, we get to positive transfers.
Claim 4.2. Under assumptions (M1)–(PR) and (PP), there exists a price level c? ∈ RΣ
+ above
which transfers are positive elements of RΣ, for any consumption allocation x• ∈ RΣLI.
Proof. Let c? ∈ RΣ






	(1 + r(0)) and c?(s) >
R(s)θ
g(s)
,∀s ∈ S (4.9)INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 17
Following (PR), c?(σ) is well-deﬁned. Note that constant K deﬁned in the previous section
(4.5) is nul, for all price level c?. Applying the results of sections 4.2 to 4.3 we obtain γ(t) =
Max{ e K,e t}, i.e. e t > 0. 
Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Proof of Part (a) :
This part follows from the compactness of the sets b X, and b Θ. Indeed, the compactness of b X
follows from Assumptions (C1). Following Assumptions (F1) and (F2), for each i ∈ I, the set
b Θi is closed and bounded: Indeed, let us consider (xi
ν,pν,qν) be a sequence in b Xi × Π and (θi
ν)
a sequence in b Θi. Then, for each ν ∈ N, we have
pν (xi
ν − ei + e gi) + e r◦(pν (xi
ν − ei)−) = e V θi
ν + wi (4.10)
By a classical compactness argument, we may suppose that the sequence (xi
ν,pν,qν) converges
to (xi,p,q). If the sequence (θi
ν) is not bounded, then, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we










 and passing to the limit, there
exists κ ∈ RJ with e V κ = 0 where kκk = 1. Assumption (F2) implies that if e V κ = 0 then κ = 0:
a contradiction. It follows that the sequence (θi
ν) is bounded, and passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we can suppose that there exists θi ∈ RJ such that (θi
ν) converges to θi and θi ∈ b Θi.
Proof of Part (b) :
Let (x•,θ
•




it is not a monetary equilibrium of E. Then for some i, there exists (xi,θi) ∈ Xi ×Θi such that
ui(xi) > ui(xi) and (xi,θi) is budget feasible. Since (xi,θ
i
) belongs to intB(Σ × L,k) then, it
is easy to ﬁnd 0 < λ 6 1 such that
(xi + λ(xi − xi)) ∈ Xi
k, and (θ
i




Moreover, (xi + λ(xi − xi),θ
i
+ λ(θi − θ
i
)) is budget feasible. Indeed, we see in the following
that budget sets are convex: for this, we need only to recall that,
∀a, a ∈ RΣL, ∀λ ∈ [0,1], (µa + (1 − λ)a)− 6 λa− + (1 − λ)a−
Finally, from Assumption C.2, we also have
ui(xi + λ(xi − xi)) > ui(xi),
which yields a contradiction. 
A2. Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof. Let (p,q,µ) ∈ Π×M. Let an agent i ∈ I. According to (C3), we can choose a consumption
plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi−ei+gi  0. Since gi > 0 and xi−ei  −gi 6 0, we get (xi−ei)+ = 0
and (xi − ei)− = −(xi − ei)  0. Thus, for every state s ∈ S, one has:






xi(s) − ei(s) + gi(s)

< 0.18 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
If p(0) 6= 0, similarly, one has:






xi(0) − ei(0) + gi(0)

< 0.
and (xi,0) belongs to β0i(p,q,µ).
If p(0) = 0, one has q 6= 0. Since 0 ∈ intΘi and for all σ ∈ S,
p(σ) · (xi(σ) − ei(σ) + e gi(σ)) + e r(σ)
 
p(σ) · (xi(σ) − ei(σ))−
< 0.
By a continuity argument, one can choose a portfolio θi ∈ Θi such that

e q · θi < 0
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
< µ(s)R(s)θi, ∀s ∈ S
which means that (xi,θi) ∈ βi(p, e q,µ). 
A3. Proof of Claim 3.2:
Proof. : Let us begin by showing property (i): Let i ∈ I and (xn,θn,pn,qn,µn) be a sequence in
Xi×Θi×Π×M. Following standard compactness argument, one can assume that the sequence
(xn,θn,pn,qn,µn) converges to (x,θ,p,q,µ) and such that (xn,θn) ∈ βi(pn,qn,µn). For each
n ∈ N,
pn(0) · (xn(0) − ei(0) + e gi(0)) + e r(0)
 
pn(0) · (xn(0) − ei(0))−
6 −e q · θn + µn(0)wi(0)
pn(s) · (xn(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
pn(s) · (xn(s) − ei(s))−
6 µn(s)(e Rθn)(s), ∀s ∈ S
Passing to the limit, we get (x,θ) belongs to βi(p,q,µ).
Let us now show that βi is l.s.c. on Π × M: Let (p,q,µ) ∈ Π × M. Since β0i(p,q,µ) has
non-empty, convex values (refer to lemma 3.1), we have βi(p,q,µ) = clβ0i(p,q,µ). Finally, the
claim follows from the fact that β0i(p,q,µ) has an open graph.
Finally, the u.s.c. follows from the continuity of the utility functions. Indeed, δi(p,q,µ) is the
argmax of ui on βi(p,q,µ). Since ui is continuous and βi is continuous on Π×M, it follows from
Berge’s Maximum theorem that δi is u.s.c. on Π×M with non-empty values. The convexity of
δi(p,q,µ) follows from the quasi-concavity of ui. 
A4. Proof of Lemma 4.1:
Proof of Part (a) :
This part follows from the compactness of the sets b X, b T and b Θ. Indeed, the compactness of b X
follows from Assumptions (C1). Following Assumptions (F1) and (F2), for each i ∈ I, the set b Θi
is bounded. Indeed, for this end, let us begin by showing that b T is a closed and bounded subset
of RΣ. Let (x•
ν,pν,qν) be a sequence in b T × b X ×Πd. Following standard compactness argument,
we may assume that the sequence (x•
ν,pν,qν) converges to (x•,p,q). Let (tν) a sequence in b T.
For each ν ∈ N, we thus have








+ pν e g − e V θ − w (4.11)INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 19
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that there exists t ∈ RΣ such that (tν)
converges to t and t ∈ b T. Let us consider an agent i ∈ I. We now show that b Θi is a closed
and bounded subset of RJ. Let us consider (xi
ν,pν,qν,tν) be a sequence in b Xi × Πd × b T. By a
classical compactness argument, we may assume that the sequence (xi
ν,pν,qν,tν) converges to
(xi,p,q,t). Let (θi
ν) be a sequence in b Θi. Then, for each ν ∈ N, we thus have
pν (xi
ν − ei + e gi) + e r◦(pν (xi
ν − ei)−) = e V θi
ν + wi + ξie tν (4.12)
If the sequence (θi




  = +∞. Multiplying (4.12) by 1/
 θi
ν
  and passing to the limit, there exists
κ ∈ RJ with κ = 0 where kκk = 1: a contradiction. It follows that the sequence (θi
ν) is bounded,
and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that there exists θi ∈ RJ such that
(θi
ν) converges to θi and θi ∈ b Θi.
Proof of Part (b) :
Let (x•,θ
•
,p,q,t) be a monetary equilibrium of Eh = (Ec
h,E
f
h,Em). Suppose that it is not a
monetary equilibrium of E. Then for some i, there exists (xi,θi) ∈ Xi × Θi such that ui(xi) >
ui(xi) and (xi,θi) is budget feasible. Since (xi,θ
i
) belongs to intB(Σ × L,h)×intB(J,h) then,
it is easy to ﬁnd 0 < γ 6 1 such that
(xi + γ(xi − xi)) ∈ Xi
k, and (θ
i




Moreover, (xi + γ(xi − xi),θ
i
+ γ(θi − θ
i
)) is budget feasible. Indeed, we see in the following
that budget sets are convex: for this, we need only to recall that,
∀a, a ∈ RΣL, ∀γ ∈ [0,1], (γa + (1 − γ)a)− 6 γa− + (1 − γ)a−
Finally, from Assumption C.2, we also have
ui(xi + γ(xi − xi)) > ui(xi),
which yields a contradiction. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. Let an agent i ∈ I. According to (C3), we can choose a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such
that xi − ei + gi  −χiI 1Σ. Since gi > 0 and xi − ei  −gi 6 0, we get (xi − ei)+ = 0 and
(xi − ei)− = −(xi − ei)  0. Thus, for every state s ∈ S, one has:






xi(s) − ei(s) + gi(s)
20 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
Note that p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + gi(s)) < −χi(s)d(s). But remark that by construction of d(s)





















ξi d(s) 6 d(s)g(s) − R(s)θ
−χi(s)d(s) 6 ξi  
d(s)g(s) − R(s)θ





Moreover, if p(0) 6= 0, similarly to the case s ∈ S , one has:





xi(0) − ei(0) + gi(0)

< 0


















> (1 + r(0))w(0)
(1 + r(0))wi(0) + ξi  
Min{1,g(0)}d(0) − (1 + r(0))w(0)

> 0
(1 + r(0))wi(0) + ξiK(0) > 0.
Since γ(t,0) = Max{e t(0), e K(0)}, one has wi(0) + ξiγ(t,0) > 0.
Hence, (xi,0) belongs to βi(p, ˜ q,t).
If p(0) = 0, one has q 6= 0. Since 0 ∈ intΘi and for all s ∈ S,
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
< ξiγ(t,s),
by a continuity argument, one can choose a portfolio θi ∈ Θi such that e q·θi < 0 ≤ wi(0)+ξiγ(t,0)
and
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + e gi(s)) + e r(s)
 
p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))−
< e R(s)θi + ξiγ(t,s), ∀s ∈ S
and (xi,θi) belongs to βi(p,q,γ(t)). 
A6. Proof of Claim 4.1:
Proof. : Let us begin by showing property (i): Let i ∈ I and (xn,θn,pn,qn,γ(tn)) be a sequence
in Xi×Θi×Πd×T. Following classical compactness argument, one can assume that the sequenceINCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 21
(xn,θn,pn,qn,γ(tn)) converges to (x,θ,p,q,γ(t)) and such that (xn,θn) ∈ Bi(pn,qn,γ(tn)). For
each n ∈ N,
pn(xn − ei + e gi) + e r◦
 
pn(xn − ei)−
6 e V θn + wi + ξiγ(tn) (4.13)
Passing to the limit, we get (x,θ) belongs to Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)).
Let us now show that Bi is l.s.c. on Πd: Let (p,q) ∈ Πd. Since βi
d(p,q,γ(t)) has non-empty,
convex values (refer to lemma 4.1), we have Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)) = clβi
d(p,q,γ(t)). Finally, the claim
follows from the fact that βi
d(p,q,γ(t) has an open graph.
Finally, the u.s.c. follows from the continuity of the utility functions. Indeed, di(p,q,γ(t)) is
the argmax of ui on Bi
d(p,q,γ(t)). Since ui is continuous and Bi
d is continuous on Πd, it follows
from Berge’s Maximum theorem that di is u.s.c. on Πd with non-empty values. The convexity
of di(p,q,γ(t)) follows from the quasi-concavity of ui. 
A.7. Proof of Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.1
Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 follow from this result:
Lemma 4.3. There exists (b R, b θ) such that
b R  0, Span b R = SpanR, b Rb θ = Rθ and b θ = I 1RJ.
Proof. The proof will be one in two steps. We begin by showing that there exists (e R, e θ) such
that
e Re θ = Rθ, Span e R = SpanR and e θ = ek.8
Indeed, according to assumption (NRA), Rθ  0. This implies that θ 6= 0, i.e. there exits an
asset k ∈ J such that θ(k) 6= 0. We posit
e θ(k) = 1 and e θ(j) = 0, ∀j 6= k
e R(k) = Rθ and e R(j) = R(j) ∀j 6= k. (4.14)
It is evident that e Re θ = Rθ. We now show that Span e R = SpanR. By construction, Span e R ⊂
SpanR. Reciprocally, in order to show that SpanR ⊂ Span e R, one only needs to show that



















 ⊂ Span e R
We now show that there exists (b R, b θ) such that
b Rb θ = e Re θ, Span b R = Span e R and b θ = I 1RJ












8The vector ek designates the vector in R
J with all its components equal to 0 except for the kth one.22 P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
Notice that, for  > 0 small enough, referring to (4.14), we have e R(k) = Rθ  0, one has b R  0.
Let us check that Span b R = Span e R. By construction, Span b R ⊂ Span e R. Reciprocally, since
J P
j=1





















 ⊂ Span b R

The proof of Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 follow:
Proof. Consider a standard economy E := (Ec,Ef,Em) satisfying assumption (NRA), i.e. Rθ 
0. According to Lemma 4.3, there exists (b R, b θ) such that
b R  0, Span b R = SpanR, b Rb θ = Rθ and b θ = I 1RJ.
If we set b E := (Ec, b Ef,Em) where we modify the ﬁnancial market Ef = (R,Θ•,θ) by b Ef =
(b R,Θ•, b θ). The auxiliary economy b Ef satisﬁes assumption (PP), (F1) and (F2). Thus, according
to Theorem 2.3, there exists a monetary equilibrium (p, b q,x•, b θ•) of b E.
Since SpanR ⊂ Span b R, we have the following property:




For every asset k ∈ J, deﬁne q(k) =
P
j∈J
γ(j)b q(j). If (p, b q,x•, b θ•) is a monetary equilibrium of b E,
then (p,q,x•,θ•) is a monetary equilibrium of E, with




Recalling the price levels properties for (p, b q), we have kp(s)k = c(s), whereas we do not know
anything on ﬁrst period price levels kp(0)k + kqk. 
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